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Abstract
We give new mechanisms for answering exponentially many queries from multiple analysts on a
private database, while protecting differential privacy both for the individuals in the database and for the
analysts. That is, our mechanism’s answer to each query is nearly insensitive to changes in the queries
asked by other analysts. Our mechanism is the first to offer differential privacy on the joint distribution
over analysts’ answers, providing privacy for data analysts even if the other data analysts collude or
register multiple accounts. In some settings, we are able to achieve nearly optimal error rates (even
compared to mechanisms which do not offer analyst privacy), and we are able to extend our techniques
to handle non-linear queries. Our analysis is based on a novel view of the private query-release problem
as a two-player zero-sum game, which may be of independent interest.
1 Introduction
Consider a tracking network that wants to sell a database of consumer data to several competing analysts
conducting market research. The administrator of the tracking network faces many opposing constraints
when deciding how to provide analysts with this data. For legal reasons, the privacy of the individuals
contained in her database must be protected. At the same time, the analysts must be able to query the
database and receive useful answers. Finally, the privacy of the queries made to the database must be
protected, since the analysts are in competition and their queries may be disclosive of proprietary strategies.
This setting of analyst privacy was recently introduced in a beautiful paper of Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan
[DNV12]. They showed that differentially private stateless mechanisms — which answer each query inde-
pendently of the previous queries — can only give accurate answers when the number of queries is at most
quadratic in the size of the database. This result rules out mechanisms that perfectly protect the privacy of
the queries, while accurately answering exponentially many queries — answers must depend on the state,
and hence on the previous queries. However, it turns out that mechanisms that offer a differential-privacy-
like guarantee with respect to the queries are possible: Dwork, et al. [DNV12] give such a mechanism, with
the guarantee that the marginal distribution on answers given to each analyst is differentially private with
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respect to the set of queries made by all of the other analysts. Their mechanism is capable of answering
exponentially many linear queries with error O˜(1/n1/4), where n is the number of records in the database.
A linear query is a (1/n)-sensitive query of the form “What fraction of the individual records in the database
satisfy some property q?”, so their mechanism gives non-trivial accuracy.
However, they note that their mechanism has several shortcomings. First, it does not promise differential
privacy on the joint distribution over multiple analysts’ answers. Therefore, if multiple analysts collude, or
if a single malicious analyst registers several false accounts with the mechanism, then the mechanism no
longer guarantees query privacy. Second, their mechanism is less accurate than known, non-analyst private
mechanisms — analyst privacy is achieved at a cost to accuracy. Finally, the mechanism can only answer
linear queries, rather than general low-sensitivity queries.
In this paper, we address all of these issues. First, we consider mechanisms which guarantee one-query-
to-many-analyst privacy: for each analyst a, the joint distribution over answers given to all other analysts
a′ 6= a is differentially private with respect to the change of a single query asked by analyst a. This privacy
guarantee is incomparable to that of Dwork, et al. [DNV12]: it is weaker, because we protect the privacy
of a single query, rather than protecting the privacy of all queries asked by analysts a′ 6= a. However, it
is also stronger, because the privacy of one query from an analyst a is preserved even if all other analysts
a′ 6= a collude or register multiple accounts. Our first result is a mechanism in this setting, with error at
most O˜(1/
√
n) for answering exponentially many linear queries. This error is optimal up to polylogarithmic
factors, even when comparing to mechanisms that only guarantee data privacy.
We then extend our techniques to one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy, where we require that the mech-
anism preserve the privacy of analyst when he changes all of his queries, even if all other analysts collude.
Our second result is a mechanism in this setting, with error O˜(1/n1/3). Although this error rate is worse
than what we achieve for one-query-to-many-analyst privacy (and not necessarily optimal), our mechanism
is still capable of answering exponentially many queries with non-trivial accuracy guarantees, while satisfy-
ing both data and analyst privacy.
These first two mechanisms operate in the non-interactive setting, where the queries from every analyst
are given to the mechanism in a single batch. Our final result is a mechanism in the online setting that
satisfies one-query-to-many analyst privacy. The mechanism accurately answers a (possibly exponentially
long) fixed sequence of low-sensitivity queries. Although our mechanism operates as queries arrive online, it
cannot tolerate adversarially chosen queries (i.e. it operates in the same regime as the smooth multiplicative
weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [HR10]). For linear queries, our mechanism gives answers with
error at most O˜(1/n2/5). For answering general queries with sensitivity 1/n (the sensitivity of a linear
query), the mechanism guarantees error at most O˜(1/n1/10).
When answering k queries on a database D ∈ X n consisting of n records from a data universe X , our
offline algorithms run in time O˜(n · (|X |+ k)) and our online algorithm runs in time O˜(|X |+n) per query.
These running times are essentially optimal for mechanisms that answer more than ω(n2) arbitrary linear
queries [Ull12], assuming (exponentially hard) one-way functions exist.
1.1 Our Techniques
To prove our results, we take a novel view of private query release as a two player zero-sum game between
a data player and a query player. For each element of the data universe x ∈ X, the data player has an action
ax. Intuitively, the data player’s mixed strategy will be his approximation of the true database’s distribution.
On the other side, for each query q ∈ Q, the query player has two actions: aq and a¬q . The two actions
for each query allow the query player to penalize the data player’s play, both when the approximate answer
to q is too high, and when it is too low — the query player tries to play queries for which the data player’s
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approximation performs poorly. Formally, we define the cost matrix by
G(aq, ax) = q(x)− q(D)
and
G(a¬q, ax) = q(D)− q(x),
where D is the private database. The query player wishes to maximize the cost, whereas the database
player wishes to minimize the cost. We show that the value of this game is 0, and that any ρ-approximate
equilibrium strategy for the database player corresponds to a database that answers every query q ∈ Q
correctly up to additive error ρ. Thus, given any pair of ρ-approximate equilibrium strategies, the strategy
for the data player will constitute a database (a distribution over X ) that answers every query to within error
O(ρ).
Different privacy constraints for the private query release problem can be mapped into privacy con-
straints for solving two-player zero-sum games. Standard private linear query release corresponds to pri-
vately computing an approximate equilibrium, where privacy is preserved with respect to changing every
cost in the game matrix by at most 1/n. Likewise, query release while protecting one-query-to-many-analyst
privacy corresponds to computing an approximate equilibrium strategy, where privacy is with respect to an
arbitrary change in two rows of the game matrix — changing a single query q changes the payoffs for ac-
tions aq and a¬q. Our main result can be viewed as an algorithm for privately computing the equilibrium
of a zero-sum game while protecting the privacy of strategies of the players, which may be of independent
interest.
To construct an approximate equilibrium, we use a well-known result: when two no-regret algorithms
are played against each other in a zero-sum game, their empirical play distributions quickly converge to an
approximate equilibrium. Thus, to compute an equilibrium of G, we have the query player and the data
player play against each other using no-regret algorithms, and output the empirical play distribution of the
data player as the hypothesis database. We face several obstacles along the way.
First, no-regret algorithms maintain a state — a distribution over actions, which is not privacy preserv-
ing. (In fact, it is computed deterministically from inputs that may depend on the data or queries.) Previous
approaches to private query release have addressed this problem by adding noise to the inputs of the no-
regret algorithm.
In our approach, we crucially rely on the fact that sampling actions from the distributions maintained
by the multiplicative weights algorithm is privacy preserving. Intuitively, privacy will come from the fact
that the multiplicative weights algorithm does not adjust the weight on any action too aggressively, meaning
that when we view the weights as defining a distribution over actions, changing the losses experienced by
the algorithm in various ways will have a limited effect on the distribution over actions. We note that this
property is not used in the private multiplicative weights mechanism of Hardt and Rothblum [HR10], who
use the distribution itself as a hypothesis. Indeed, without the constraint of query privacy, any no-regret
algorithm can be used in place of multiplicative weights [RR10, GRU12], which is not the case in our
setting.
Second, sampling from the multiplicative weights algorithm is private only if the changes in losses are
small. Intuitively, we must ensure that changing one query from one analyst does not affect the losses
experienced by the data player too dramatically, so that samples from the multiplicative weights algorithm
will indeed ensure query privacy. To enforce this requirement, we force the query player to play mixed
strategies from the set of smooth distributions, which do not place too much weight on any single action.
It is known that playing any no-regret algorithm, but projecting into the set of smooth distributions in the
appropriate way (via a Bregman projection), will ensure no-regret with respect to any smooth distribution
3
on actions. For comparison, no-regret is typically defined with respect to the best single action, which is a
not a smooth distribution. Thus, our regret guarantee is weaker.
The result of this simulation is an approximate equilibrium strategy for the data player, in the sense that
it achieves approximately the value of the game when played against all but s strategies of the query player,
where 1/s is the maximum probability that the query player may assign to any action. This corresponds
to a synthetic database, which we release to all analysts, that answers all but s queries accurately. Then,
since we choose s to be small, we can answer the mishandled queries with the sparse vector technique
[DNR+09, RR10, HR10] adding noise only O˜(√s/n) to these s queries. The result is a nearly optimal error
rate of O˜(1/
√
n)
Our techniques naturally extend to one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy by making the actions of the
query player correspond to entire workloads of queries, one for each analyst, where the query player picks
analysts that have at least one query that has high error on the current hypothesis. Like before, a small
number of analysts will have queries that have high error, which we handle with a separate private query
release mechanism for each analyst.
Finally, we use these techniques to convert the private multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and
Rothblum [HR10] into an online algorithm that preserves one-query-to-many-analyst privacy, and also an-
swers arbitrary low-sensitivity queries. These last two extensions both give first-of-their-kind results, but at
some degradation in the accuracy parameters: we do not obtain O(1/
√
n) error rate. We leave it as an open
problem to achieve O˜(1/
√
n) error in these settings, or show that the accuracy cost is necessary.
1.2 Related Work
There is an extremely large body of work on differential privacy [DMNS06] that we do not attempt to
survey. The study of differential privacy was initiated by a line of work [DN03, BDMN05, DMNS06]
culminating in the definition by Dwork, Mcsherry, Nissim, and Smith [DMNS06], who also introduced the
basic technique of answering low-sensitivity queries using the Laplace mechanism. The Laplace mechanism
gives approximate answers to nearly O(n2) queries while preserving differential privacy.
A recent line of work [BLR08, DNR+09, DRV10, RR10, HR10, GHRU11, GRU12, HLM12] has shown
how to accurately answer almost exponentially many queries usefully while preserving differential privacy
of the data. Some of this work [RR10, HR10, GRU12] rely on no-regret algorithms — in particular, Hardt
and Rothblum [HR10] introduced the multiplicative weights technique to the differential privacy literature,
which we use centrally.
However, we make use of multiplicative weights in a different way from prior work in private query
release — we simulate play of a two-player zero-sum game using two copies of the multiplicative weights
algorithm, and rely on the fast convergence of such play to approximate Nash equilibrium [FS96]. We
also rely on the fact that Bregman projections onto a convex set K can be used in conjunction with the
multiplicative weights update rule1 to achieve no regret with respect to the best element in the set K
[RS12]. Finally, we use that samples from the multiplicative weights distribution can be viewed as samples
from the exponential mechanism of McSherry and Talwar [MT07], and hence are privacy preserving.
Our use of Bregman projections into smooth distributions is similar to its use in smooth boosting. Barak,
Hardt, and Kale [BHK09] use Bregman projections in a similar way, and the weight capping used by Dwork,
Rothblum, and Vadhan [DRV10] in their analysis of boosting for people can be viewed as a Bregman
projection.
1Indeed, they can be used in conjunction with any no-regret algorithm in the family of regularized empirical risk minimizers.
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The most closely related paper to ours is the beautiful recent work of Dwork, Naor, and Vadhan [DNV12],
who introduce the idea of analyst privacy. They show that any algorithm which can answer ω(n2) queries
to non-trivial accuracy must maintain common state as it interacts with many data analysts, and hence po-
tentially violates the privacy of the analysts. Accordingly, they give a stateful mechanism which promises
many-to-one-analyst privacy, and achieves per-query error O˜(1/n1/4) for linear queries — their mechanism
promises differential privacy on the marginal distribution of answers given to any single analyst, even when
all other analysts change all of their queries. However, if multiple analysts collude, or if a single analyst
can falsely register under many ids, then the privacy guarantees degrade quickly — privacy is not promised
on the joint distribution on all analysts answers. Lifting this limitation, improving the error bounds and
extending analyst privacy to non-linear queries, are all stated as open questions.
Finally, the varying notions of analyst privacy we use can be interpreted in the context of two-party
differential privacy, introduced by McGregor, et al. [MMP+10]. If we consider a single analyst as one party,
sending private queries to a second party consisting of the mechanism and all the other parties indirectly, the
many-to-one-analyst privacy guarantee is equivalent to privacy of the first party’s view. Here, the privacy
must be protected even if the second party changes its inputs arbitrarily, i.e., the other analysts change their
queries arbitrarily.
On other hand, if we consider all but one analyst as the first party, sending queries to the mechanism
and the remaining analyst, one-query-to-many-analyst privacy is equivalent to the first party’s view being
private when the single analyst changes a query. One-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy is similar: the first
party’s view must be private when the second party changes all of its queries.
2 Preliminaries
Differential Privacy and Analyst Differential Privacy Let a database D ∈ X n be a collection of n
records (rows)
{x(1), . . . , x(n)} from a data universe X . Two databases D,D′ ∈ X n are adjacent if they differ only
on a single row, which we denote by D ∼ D′.
A mechanism A : X n → R takes a database as input and outputs some data structure in R. We are
interested in mechanisms that satisfy differential privacy.
Definition 2.1. A mechanismA : X n →R is (ε, δ)-differentially private if for every two adjacent databases
D ∼ D′ ∈ X n and every subset S ⊆ R,
Pr [A(D) ∈ S] ≤ eεPr [A(D′) ∈ S]+ δ.
In this work we construct mechanisms that ensure differential privacy for the analyst as well as for
the database. To define analyst privacy, we first define many-analyst mechanisms. Let Q be the set
of all allowable queries. The mechanism takes m sets of queries Q1, . . . ,Qm and returns m outputs
Z1, . . . , Zm, where Zj contains answers to the queries Qj . Thus, a many-analyst mechanism has the
form A : X n × (Q∗)m → Rm. Given sets of queries Q1, . . . ,Qm, let Q =
⋃m
j=1Qj denote the set
of all queries. In guaranteeing privacy even in the event of collusion, it will be useful to refer to the out-
put given to all analysts other than some analyst i. For each id ∈ [m] we write A(D,Q)−id to denote
(Z1, . . . , Zid−1, Zid+1, . . . , Zm), the output given to all analysts other than id.
Let Q = Q1, . . . ,Qm and Q′ = Q′1, . . . ,Q′m. We say that Q and Q′ are analyst-adjacent if there exists
id∗ ∈ [m] such that for every id 6= id∗, Qid = Q′id. That is, Q ∼ Q′ are analyst adjacent if they differ only
on the queries asked by one analyst. Intuitively, a mechanism satisfies one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy
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if changing all the queries asked by analyst id∗ does not significantly affect the output given to all analysts
other than id∗.
Definition 2.2. A many-analyst mechanism A satisfies (ε, δ)-one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy if for
every database D ∈ X n, every two analyst-adjacent query sequences Q ∼ Q′ that differ only on one set of
queries Qid,Q′id, and every S ⊆ Rm−1,
Pr [A(D,Q)−id ∈ S] ≤ eεPr
[A(D,Q′)−id ∈ S]+ δ.
Let Q = Q1, . . . ,Qm and Q′ = Q′1, . . . ,Q′m. We say that Q and Q′ are query-adjacent if there exists
id∗ such that for every id 6= id∗, Qid = Q′id and |Qid∗△Q′id∗ | ≤ 1. That is, Q ∼ Q′ are query adjacent
if they differ only on one of the queries. Intuitively, we say that a mechanism satisfies one-query-to-many-
analyst privacy if changing one query asked by analyst id∗ does not significantly affect the output given to
all analysts other than id∗.
Definition 2.3. A many-analyst mechanism A satisfies (ε, δ)-one-query-to-many-analyst privacy if for ev-
ery database D ∈ X n, every two query-adjacent query sequences Q ∼ Q′ that differ only on one query in
Qid,Q′id, and every S ⊆ Rm−1,
Pr [A(D,Q)−id ∈ S] ≤ eεPr
[A(D,Q′)−id ∈ S]+ δ.
In our proofs of both differential privacy and analyst privacy, we will often establish that for anyD ∼ D′,
the two distributions A(D),A(D′) are such that with probability at least 1− δ over y ←R M(D),∣∣∣∣ln( Pr[A(D) = y]Pr[A(D′) = y]
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
This condition implies (ε, δ)-differential privacy [DRV10].
2.1 Queries and Accuracy
In this work we consider two types of queries: low-sensitivity queries and linear queries. Low-sensitivity
queries are parameterized by ∆ ∈ [0, 1]: a ∆-sensitive query is any function q : X n → [0, 1] such that
max
D∼D′
|q(D)− q(D′)| ≤ ∆.
A linear query is a particular type of low-sensitivity query, specified by a function q : X → [0, 1]. We define
the evaluation of q on a database D ∈ X n to be
q(D) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
q(x(i)),
so a linear query is evidently (1/n)-sensitive.
SinceAmay output a data structure, we must specify how to answer queries inQ from the outputA(D).
Hence, we require that there is an evaluator E : R×Q → R that estimates q(D) from the output of A(D).
For example, if A outputs a vector of “noisy answers” Z = {q(D) + Zq|q ∈ Q}, where Zq is a random
variable for each q ∈ Q, then R = RQ and E(Z, q) is the q-th component of Z . Abusing notation, we write
q(Z) and q(A(D)) as shorthand for E(Z, q) and E(A(D), q), respectively.
Definition 2.4. An output Z of a mechanism A(D) is α-accurate for query set Q if |q(Z)− q(D)| ≤ α for
every q ∈ Q. A mechanism is (α, β)-accurate for query set Q if for every database D,
Pr [∀q ∈ Q, |q(A(D)) − q(D)| ≤ α] ≥ 1− β,
where the probability is taken over the coins of A.
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2.2 Differential Privacy Tools
We will use a few previously known differentially private mechanisms. When we need to answer a small
number of queries we will use the well-known Laplace mechanism [DMNS06], with an improved analysis
from [DRV10].
Lemma 2.5. Let F = {f1, . . . , f|F|} be a set of ∆-sensitive queries fi : X n → [0, 1], and let D ∈ X n be
a database. Let ǫ, δ ≤ 1. Then the mechanism ALap(D,F) that outputs
fi(D) + Lap
(
∆
√
8|F| log(1/δ)
ε
)
for every fi ∈ F is:
1. (ε, δ)-differentially private, and
2. (α, β)-accurate for any β ∈ (0, 1] and α = ε−1∆√8|F| log(1/δ) log(|F|/β).
When we need to answer a large number of queries, we will use the multiplicative weights mechanism
from [HR10], with an improved analysis from Gupta et al. [GRU12].
Lemma 2.6. Let F = {f1, . . . , f|F|} be a set of (1/n)-sensitive linear queries, fi : X n → [0, 1]. Let
D ∈ X n be a database. Then there is a mechanism AMW(D,F) that is:
1. (ε, δ)-differentially private, and
2. (α, β)-accurate for any β ∈ (0, 1] and
α = O
(
log1/4 |X |√log(|F|/β) log(1/δ)
ε1/2n1/2
)
.
Remark 2.7. We use the above lemma as a black box, agnostic to the algorithm which instantiates these
guarantees.
Our algorithms also use the private sparse vector algorithm. This algorithm takes as input a database and
a set of low-sensitivity queries, with the promise that only a small number of the queries have large answers
on the input database. Its output is a set of queries with large answers on the input database. Importantly
for this work, the sparse vector algorithm (cf. [HR10, Rot11]) ensures the privacy of the input queries in a
strong sense.
Lemma 2.8. Let F = {f1, . . . , f|F|} be a set of ∆-sensitive functions, fi : X n → [0, 1]. Let D ∈ X n be a
database, α ∈ (0, 1], k ∈ [|F|] such that
| {i | fi(D) ≥ α} | ≤ k.
Then there is an algorithm ASV(D,F) that
1. is (ε, δ)-differentially private with respect to D,
2. returns I ⊆ [|F|] of size at most k such that with probability at least 1− β,{
i | fi(D) ≥ α+ ε−1∆
√
8k log(1/δ) log(|F|/β)
}
⊆ I ⊆ {i | fi(D) ≥ α} ,
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3. and is perfectly private with respect to the queries:
if F ′ =
{
f1, . . . , f
′
j, . . . , fk
}
, then for every D and i 6= j,
Pr [i ∈ ASV(D,F)] = Pr
[
i ∈ ASV(D,F ′)
]
.
We will also use the Composition Theorem of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan [DRV10].
Lemma 2.9. Let A : X ∗ → RT be a mechanism such that for every pair of adjacent inputs x ∼ x′, every
t ∈ [T ], every r1, . . . , rt−1 ∈ R, and every rt ∈ R,
Pr [At(x) = rt | A1,...,t−1(x) = r1, . . . , rt−1]
≤ eε0Pr [At(x′) = rt | A1,...,t−1(x′) = r1, . . . , rt−1]+ δ0
for ε0 ≤ 1/2. Then A is (ε, δ)-differentially private for ε =
√
8T log(1/δ) + 2ε20T and δ = δ0T .
2.3 Multiplicative Weights
Let A : A → [0, 1] be a measure over a set of actions A. We use |A| =∑a∈AA(a) to denote the density of
A. A measure naturally corresponds to a probability distribution A˜ in which
Pr
[
A˜ = a
]
= A(a)/|A|
for every a ∈ A. Throughout, we will use calligraphic letters (A) to denote a set of actions, lower case
letters (a) to denote the actions, capital letters (A) to denote a measure over actions, and capital letters
with a tilde to denote the corresponding distributions (A˜). We will use the KL-divergence between two
distributions, defined to be
KL(A˜||A˜′) =
∑
a∈A
A˜(a) log
(
A˜(a)/A˜′(a)
)
.
Let L : A → [0, 1] be a loss function (losses L). Abusing notation, we can define L(A) = E
[
L(A˜)
]
. Given
an initial measure A1, we can define the multiplicative weights algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Multiplicative Weights Algorithm, MWη
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
Sample at ←R A˜t
Receive losses Lt (may depend on A1, a1, . . . , At−1, at−1)
Update: For each a ∈ A:
Update At+1(a) = e−ηLt(a)At(a) for every a ∈ A
The following theorem about the multiplicative weights update is well-known.
Theorem 2.10 (Multiplicative Weights.See e.g. [RS12]). Let A1 be the uniform measure of density 1, and
let {a1, . . . , aT } be the actions obtained by MWη with losses {L1, . . . , Lt}. Let A∗ = 1a=a∗ , for some
a∗ ∈ A, and δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then with probability at least 1− β,
E
t←R[T ]
[Lt(at)] ≤ (1 + η) E
t←R[T ]
[Lt(A
∗)] +
KL(A˜∗||A˜1)
ηT
+
4 log(1/β)√
T
≤ E
t←R[T ]
[Lt(A
∗)] + η +
log |A|
ηT
+
4 log(1/β)√
T
.
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We need to work with a variant of multiplicative weights that only produces measures A of high density,
which will imply that A˜ does not assign too much probability to any single element of A. To this end,
we will apply (a special case of) the Bregman projection to the measures obtained from the multiplicative
weights update rule.
Definition 2.11. Let s ∈ (0,U ]. Given a measure A such that |A| ≤ s, let ΓsA be the (Bregman) projection
of A into the set of density-s measures, obtained by computing c ≥ 1 such that s = ∑a∈Amin{1, cA(a)}
and setting ΓA(a) = min{1, cM(a)} for every a ∈ A. We call s is the density of measure A.
Algorithm 2 The Dense Multiplicative Weights Algorithm, DMWs,η
For t = 1, 2, . . . , T :
Let A′t = ΓsAt, and sample at ←R A˜′t
Receive losses Lt (may depend on A1, a1, . . . , At−1, at−1)
Update: For each a ∈ A:
Update At+1(a) = e−ηLt(a)At(a)
Given an initial measure A1 such that |A1| ≤ s, we can define the dense multiplicative weights algorithm
in Algorithm 2. Note that we update the unprojected measure At, but sample at using the projected measure
ΓsAt. Observe that the update step can only decrease the density, so we will have |At| ≤ s for every t. Like
before, given a sequence of losses {L1, . . . , LT } and an initial measure A1 of density s, we can consider
the sequence {A1, . . . , AT } where At+1 is given by the projected multiplicative weights update applied to
At, Lt. The following theorem is known.
Theorem 2.12. LetA1 be the uniform measure of density 1 and let {a1, . . . , aT } be the sequence of measures
obtained by DMWs,η with losses {L1, . . . , LT }. Let A∗ = 1a∈S∗ for some set S∗ ⊆ A of size s, and
δ ∈ (0, 1]. Then with probability 1− β,
E
t←R[T ]
[Lt(ΓAt)] ≤ (1 + η) E
t←R[T ]
[Lt(A
∗)] +
KL(A˜∗||A˜1)
ηT
+
4 log(1/β)√
T
≤ E
t←R[T ]
[Lt(A
∗)] + η +
log |A|
ηT
+
4 log(1/β)√
T
.
2.4 Regret Minimization and Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
Let G : AR×AC → [0, 1] be a two-player zero-sum game between players (R)ow and (C)olumn, who take
actions r ∈ AR and c ∈ AC and receive losses G(r, c) and −G(r, c), respectively. Let ∆(AR),∆(AC) be
the set of measures over actions in AR and AC , respectively. The well-known minimax theorem states that
v := min
R∈∆(AR)
max
C∈∆(AC)
G(R,C) = max
C∈∆(AC)
min
R∈∆(AR)
G(R,C).
We define this quantity v to be the value of the game.
Freund and Schapire [FS96] showed that if two sequences of actions {r1, . . . , rT } , {c1, . . . , cT } are
“no-regret with respect to one another”, then r˜ = 1T
∑T
t=1 rt and c˜ = 1T
∑T
t=1 ct form an approximate
equilibrium strategy pair. More formally, if
max
c∈AC
E
t
[G(rt, c)]− ρ ≤ E
t
[G(rt, ct)] ≤ min
r∈AR
E
t
[G(r, ct)] + ρ,
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then
v − 2ρ ≤ G(r˜, c˜) ≤ v + 2ρ.
Thus, if Row chooses actions using the multiplicative weights update rule with losses Lt(rt) = G(rt, ct)
and Column chooses actions using the multiplicative weights rule with losses Lt(rt) = −G(rt, ct), then
each player’s distribution on actions converges to a minimax strategy. That is, if we play until both players
have regret at most ρ:
max
c
G(r˜, c) ≤ v + 2ρ v − 2ρ ≤ min
r
G(r, c˜).
For query privacy in our view of query release as a two player game, Column must not put too much
weight on any single query. Thus, we need an analogue of this result in the case where Column is not
choosing actions according to the multiplicative weights update, but rather using the projected multiplicative
weights update. In this case we cannot hope to obtain an approximate minimax strategy, since Column
cannot play any single action with significant probability. However, we can define an alternative notion of
the value of a game where Column is restricted in this way: let ∆s(AC) be the set of measures over AC of
minimum density at least s, and define
vs := min
R∈∆(AR)
max
C∈∆s(AC )
G(R,C).
Notice that vs ≤ v, and vs can be very different from v.
Theorem 2.13. Let {r1, . . . , rT } ∈ AR be a sequence of row-player actions, {C1, . . . , CT } ∈ ∆s(AC) be
a sequence of high-density measures over column-player actions, and {c1, . . . , cT } ∈ AC be a sequence of
column-player actions such that cj ←R Cj for every t ∈ [T ]. Further, suppose that
E
t
[G(rt, ct)] ≤ min
R∈∆(AR)
E
t
[G(R, ct)] + ρ and E
t
[G(rt, ct)] ≥ max
C∈∆s(AC )
E
t
[G(rt, C)]− ρ.
Then,
vs − 2ρ ≤ G(r˜, c˜) ≤ v + 2ρ.
Moreover, r˜ is an approximate min-max strategy with respect to strategies in ∆s(AC), i.e.,
vs − 2ρ ≤ max
C∈∆s(AC )
G(r˜, C) ≤ v + 2ρ.
Proof. For the first set of inequalities, we handle each part separately. For one direction,
vs = min
R∈∆(AR)
max
C∈∆s(AC )
G(R,C)
≤ max
C∈∆s(AC )
E
t
[G(rt, C)] ≤ E
t
[G(rt, ct)] + ρ
≤ min
R∈∆(AR)
E
t
[G(R, ct)] + 2ρ = min
R∈∆(AR)
G(R, c˜) + 2ρ
≤ G(r˜, c˜) + 2ρ.
The other direction is similar, starting with the fact that v = maxc∈C minr∈RG(r, c).
For the second set of inequalities, we also handle the two cases separately. For the upper bound,
max
C∈∆s(AC)
E
t
[G(r˜, C)] ≤ E
t
[G(rt, ct)] + ρ
≤ min
R∈∆(AR)
E
t
[G(R, ct)] + 2ρ = min
R∈∆(AR)
G(R, c˜) + 2ρ
≤ v + 2ρ.
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For the lower bound,
max
C∈∆s(AC )
G(r˜, C) ≥ E
t
[G(r˜, c˜)] ≥ vs − 2ρ
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 2.14. Let G : AR × AC → [0, 1]. If the row player chooses actions {r1, . . . , rT } by running
MWη with loss functions Lt(r) = G(r, ct) and the column player chooses actions {c1, . . . , cT } by running
DMWs,η with the loss functions Lt(c) = −G(rt, c), then with probability at least 1− β,
vs − 2ρ ≤ max
c∈Cs
G(r˜, c) ≤ v + 2ρ,
for
ρ = η +
max{log |AR|, log |AC |}
ηT
+
4 log(2/β)√
T
.
3 A One-Query-To-Many-Analyst Private Mechanism
3.1 An Offline Mechanism for Linear Queries
We define our offline mechanisms for releasing linear queries in Algorithm 3.
3.1.1 Accuracy Analysis
Theorem 3.1. The offline algorithm for linear queries is (α, β)-accurate for
α = O
(√
log(|X |+ |Q|) log(1/δ) log(|Q|/β)
ε
√
n
)
.
Proof. Observe that the algorithm is computing an approximate equilibrium of the game GD(x, q) =
1+q(D)−q(x)
2 . Let v, vs be the value and constrained value of this game, respectively. First, we pin down
the quantities v and vs.
Claim 3.2. For every D, the value and constrained value of GD is 1/2.
Proof of Claim 3.2. It’s clear that the value (and hence constrained value) is at most 1/2, because
min
x
max
q
1 + q(D)− q(x)
2
≤ max
q
1 + q(D)− q(D)
2
=
1
2
.
Suppose we choose x such that (1+q(D)−q(x))/2 < 1/2 for some q ∈ Q. Then, since the query q′ = 1−q
is also in Q, (1 + q′(D)− q′(x))/2 > 1/2. But then maxq∈Q(1 + q(D)− q(x))/2 > 1/2, so the value of
the game is at least 1/2.
For the constrained value, suppose we choose x such that Eq←RQ [(1 + q(D)− q(x))/2] < 1/2 for some
Q ∈ Qs. Then we can flip every query inQ to get a new distribution Q′ such that Eq←RQ′ [(1 + q(D)− q(x))/2] >
1/2. So vs ≥ 1/2 as well.
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Algorithm 3 Offline Mechanism for Linear Queries with One-Query-to-Many-Analyst Privacy
Input: Database D ∈ X n and sets of linear queries Q1, . . . ,Qm.
Initialize: Let Q = ⋃mj=1Qj ∪ ¬Qj , D0(x) = 1/|X | for every x ∈ X , Q0(q) = 1/|Q| for every q ∈ Q,
T = n ·max{log |X |, log |Q|}, η = ε
2
√
T log(1/δ)
, s = 12T
DataPlayer:
On input a query q̂t, for each x ∈ X :
Update Dt(x) = Dt−1(x) · exp
(
−η
(
1+q̂t(D)−q̂t(x)
2
))
Choose x̂t ←R D˜t and send x̂t to QueryPlayer
QueryPlayer:
On input a data element x̂t, for each q ∈ Q:
Update Qt+1(q) = Qt(q) · exp
(
−η
(
1+q(D)−q(x̂t)
2
))
Let Pt+1 = ΓsQt+1
Choose q̂t+1 ←R P˜t+1 and send q̂t+1 to DataPlayer
GenerateSynopsis:
Let D̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂T ).
Run sparse vector on D̂, obtain a set of at most s queries Qf
Run Laplace Mechanism, obtain answer aq for each q ∈ Qf
Output D̂ to all analysts.
For each q ∈ Qf , output (q, aq) to the analyst that issued q.
Let D̂ = 1T
∑T
t=1 xt. By Corollary 2.14,
vs − 2ρ ≤ max
Q∈∆s(Q)
(
1
2
E
q←RQ˜
[
1 + q(D)− q(D̂)
])
≤ v + 2ρ.
Applying Claim 3.2 and rearranging terms, with probability at least 1− β/3,∣∣∣∣∣ maxQ∈∆s(Q)
(
E
q←RQ˜
[
q(D)− q(D̂)
])∣∣∣∣∣ = maxQ∈∆s(Q)
(
E
q←RQ˜
[∣∣∣q(D)− q(D̂)∣∣∣]) ≤ 4ρ
= 4
(
η +
max{log |X |, log |Q|}
ηT
+
4 log(2/β)√
T
)
= O
(√
log(|X | + |Q|) log(1/δ) + log(1/β)
ε
√
n
)
:= α
D̂
.
The previous statement suffices to show that |q(D) − q(D˜)| ≤ αD̂ for all but s queries. Otherwise,
the uniform distribution over the bad queries would be a distribution over queries contained in ∆s(Q), with
expected error larger than αD̂.
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We can now run the sparse vector algorithm (Lemma 2.5). With probability at least 1 − β/3, it will
identify every query q with error larger than α
D̂
+ αSV for
αSV = O
(√
s log(1/δ) log(|Q|/β)
εn
)
.
Since there are at most s such queries, with probability at least 1−β/3, the Laplace mechanism (Lemma 2.8)
answers these queries to within error
αLap = O
(√
s log(1/δ) log(s/β)
εn
)
.
Now, observe that in the final output, there are two ways that a query can be answered: either by D̂, in
which case its answer can have error as large as αD̂ + αSV, or by the Laplace mechanism, in which case its
answer can have error as large as αLap. Thus, with probability at least 1− β, every query has error at most
max{αD̂ + αSV, αLap}. Substituting our choice of s = 12T = O(n log(|X | + |Q|)) and simplifying, we
conclude that the mechanism is (α, β)-accurate for
α = O
(√
log(|X |+ |Q|) log(1/δ) log(|Q|/β)
ε
√
n
)
.
3.1.2 Data Privacy
Theorem 3.3. Algorithm 3 satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for the data.
Before proving the theorem, we will state a useful lemma about the Bregman projection onto the set of
high density measures (Definition 2.11).
Lemma 3.4 (Projection Preserves Differential Privacy). Let A0, A1 : A → [0, 1] be two full-support mea-
sures over a set of actions A and s ∈ (0, |A|) be such that |A0|, |A1| ≤ s and | ln(A0(a)/A1(a))| ≤ ε for
every a ∈ A. Let A′0 = ΓsA0 and A′1 = ΓsA1. Then | ln(A′0(a)/A′1(a))| ≤ 2ε for every a ∈ A.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Recall that to compute A′ = ΓsA, we find a “scaling factor” c > 1 such that∑
a∈A
min{1, cA(a)} = s,
and set A′(a) = min{1, cA(a)}. Let c0 and c1 be the scaling factors for A′0 and A′1 respectively. Assume
without loss of generality that c0 ≤ c1. First, observe that∣∣∣∣ln(min{1, c0A0(a)}min{1, c0A1(a)}
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ln(A0(a)A1(a)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε,
for every a ∈ A. Second, we observe that c1/c0 ≤ eε. If this were not the case, then we would have
c1A1(a) ≥ c0A1(a)eε ≥ c0A0(a) for every a ∈ A, with strict inequality for at least one a. But then,∑
a∈A
min{1, c1A1(a)} >
∑
a∈A
min{1, c0A0(a)} = s,
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which would contradict the choice of c1. Thus,∣∣∣∣ln(min{1, c0A0(a)}min{1, c1A1(a)}
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣∣ln(min{1, c0A0(a)}min{1, c0A1(a)}
)∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣ln(c1c0
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε+ ε = 2ε,
for every a ∈ A.
Now we prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. We focus on analyzing the privacy properties of the output D̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂T ), the
privacy of the final stage of the mechanism will follow from standard arguments in differential privacy. We
will actually show the stronger guarantee that the sequence v = (x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂T , q̂T ) is differentially private
for the data. Fix a pair of adjacent databases D0 ∼ D1 and let V0, V1 denote the distribution on sequences
v when the mechanism is run on database D0,D1 respectively. We will show that with probability at least
1− δ/3 over v = (x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂T , q̂T )←R V0,∣∣∣∣ln(V0(v)V1(v)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε3 ,
which is no weaker than (ε/3, δ/3)-differential privacy. To do so, we analyze the privacy of each element
of v, x̂t or q̂t, and apply the composition analysis of Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan [DRV10]. Define
ε0 = 2ηT/n.
Claim 3.5. For every v, and every t ∈ [T ],∣∣∣∣ln(V0(x̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t−1, q̂t−1)V1(x̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t−1, q̂t−1)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε0.
Proof of Claim 3.5. We can prove the statement by the following direct calculation.
∣∣∣∣ln(V0(x̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t−1, q̂t−1)V1(x̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t−1, q̂t−1)
)∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
exp
(
−(η/2)∑t−1j=1 1 + q̂j(D0)− q̂j(x̂t))
exp
(
−(η/2)∑t−1j=1 1 + q̂j(D1)− q̂j(x̂t))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
η
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
j=1
1 + q̂j(D0)− q̂j(x̂t)
−
t−1∑
j=1
1 + q̂j(D1)− q̂j(x̂t)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
η
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
j=1
q̂j(D0)− q̂j(D1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ η(t− 1)2n ≤ ηT2n ≤ ε0
Claim 3.6. For every v, and every t ∈ [T ],∣∣∣∣ln(V0(q̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t)V1(q̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε0.
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Proof of Claim 3.6. The sample q̂t is made according to P˜t, which is the distribution corresponding to the
projected measure Pt. First we’ll look at the unprojected measure Qt. Observe that, for any database D and
query q,
Qt(q) = exp
−(η/2) t−1∑
j=1
1 + q(D)− q(x̂j)
 .
Thus, if Q0(q) is the measure we would have when database D0 is the input, and Q1(q) is the measure we
would have when database D1 is the input, then∣∣∣∣ln(Q0(q)Q1(q)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ η2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
t−1∑
j=1
qj(D0)− qj(D1)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηT2n ,
for every q ∈ Q. Given that Q0 and Q1 satisfy this condition, Lemma 3.4 guarantees that the projected
measures satisfy ∣∣∣∣ln(P0(q)P1(q)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ηTn .
Finally, we note that if the above condition is satisfied for every q ∈ Q, then the distributions P˜0, P˜1 satisfy∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
P˜0(q)
P˜1(q)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2ηTn ≤ ε0,
because the value of the normalizer also changes by at most a multiplicative factor of e±ηT/n. We observe
that Vb(q̂t | x̂1, q̂1, . . . , x̂t) = P˜b(q̂t) for b ∈ {0, 1}, which completes the proof of the claim.
Now, the composition lemma (Lemma 2.9) (for 2T -fold composition) guarantees that with probability
at least 1− δ/3, ∣∣∣∣ln(V0(v)V1(v)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε0√4T log(3/δ) + 4ε20T,
which is at most ε/3 by our choice of ε0. This implies that D̂ is (ε/3, δ/3)-differentially private.
We note that the sparse vector computation to find the s queries with large error is (ε/3, δ/3)-differentially
private, by our choice of parameters (Lemma 2.8), and the answers to the queries found by sparse vector
are (ε/3, δ/3)-differentially private for our choice of parameters (Lemma 2.5).2 The theorem follows from
composition.
3.1.3 Query Privacy
Theorem 3.7. Algorithm 3 satisfies (ε, δ)-one-query-to-many-analyst differential privacy.
Before proving query privacy of Algorithm 3, we will state a useful composition lemma. The lemma is a
generalization of the “secrecy of the sample lemma” [KLN+11, DRV10] to the interactive setting. Consider
the following game:
2We could improve the constants in our privacy analysis slightly by finding the queries with large error using sparse vector and
answering them using the Laplace mechanism in one step. However, in our algorithm for achieving analyst-to-many privacy, we
need to do the analogous steps separately, and thus we chose to present them this way to maintain modularity.
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• Fix an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism A : U∗ →R and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Let D0 = ∅.
• For t = 1, . . . , T :
– The (randomized) adversary B(y1, . . . , yt; r) chooses two distributions B0t , B1t such that SD(B0t , B1t ) ≤
σ.
– Choose xt ←R Bbt and let Dt = Dt−1 ∪ {xt}.
– Choose yt ←R A(Dt).
For a fixed mechanism A and adversary B, let V 0 be the distribution on (y1, . . . , yT ) when b = 0 and V 1
be the distribution on (y1, . . . , yT ) when b = 1.
Lemma 3.8. If ε ≤ 1/2 and Tσ ≤ 1/12, then with probability at least 1−Tδ−δ′ over y = (y1, . . . , yT )←R
V 0, ∣∣∣∣ln(V 0(y)V 1(y)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(Tσ)√2T log(1/δ′) + 30ε2(Tσ)T.
(We prove this lemma in Appendix A.)
We also need another lemma about the Bregman projection onto the set of high-density measures (Defi-
nition 2.11)
Lemma 3.9. Let A0 : A → [0, 1] and A1 : A ∪ {a∗} → [0, 1] be two full-support measures over their
respective sets of actions and s ∈ (0, |A|) be such that 1) |A0|, |A1| ≤ s and 2) A0(a) = A1(a) for every
a ∈ A. Let A′0 = ΓsA0 and A′1 = ΓsA1. Then SD(A˜′0, A˜′1) ≤ 1/s.
Proof of Lemma 3.9. Using the form of the projection (Definition 2.11), it is not hard to see that for a 6= a∗,
A′0(a) ≥ A′1(a). For convenience, we will write A′0(a∗) = 0 even though a∗ is technically outside of the
domain of A′0. We can now show the following.∑
a∈A∪{a∗}
|A′0(a)−A′1(a)| = |A′0(a∗)−A′1(a∗)|+
∑
a6=a∗
|A′0(a)−A′1(a)|
≤ 1 +
∑
a6=a∗
|A′0(a)−A′1(a)|
= 1 +
∑
a6=a∗
A′0(a)−A′1(a) (A′0(a) ≥ A′1(a) for a 6= a∗)
= 1 + |A′0| − (|A′1| −A′1(a∗)) ≤ 1 + |A′0| − (|A′1| − 1)
= 1 + s− (s− 1) = 2
We also have that |A′0| = |A′1| = s, so
SD(A˜′0, A˜
′
1) =
1
2
∑
a∈A∪{a∗}
∣∣∣∣A′0(a)|A′0| − A
′
1(a)
|A′1|
∣∣∣∣
=
1
2s
∑
a∈A∪{a∗}
|A′0(a)−A′1(a)| ≤
1
s
.
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Now we can prove one-query-to-many-analyst privacy.
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Fix a database D. Consider two adjacent query sets Q0 ∼ Q1 and, without loss of
generality assumeQ0 = Q1∪{q∗} and that q∗ ∈ Qid for some analyst id. We write the output to all analysts
as v = (x̂1, . . . , x̂T , b1, . . . , b|Q|, a1, . . . , a|Q|) where D̂ = {x̂1, . . . , x̂T } is the database that is released to
all analysts, b1, . . . , b|Q| is a sequence of bits that indicates whether or not qj(D̂) is close to qj(D), and
a1, . . . , a|Q| is a sequence of approximate answers to the queries qj(D) (or ⊥, if qj(D̂) is already accurate).
We write v−id for the portion of v that excludes outputs specific to analyst id’s queries. Let V0, V1 be the
distribution on outputs when the query set is Q0 and Q1, respectively.
We analyze the three parts of v separately. First we show that D̂, which is shared among all analysts,
satisfies analyst privacy.
Claim 3.10. With probability at least 1− δ over the samples x̂1, . . . , x̂T ←R V0,∣∣∣∣ln(V0(x̂1, . . . , x̂T )V1(x̂1, . . . , x̂T )
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Proof of Claim 3.10. To prove the claim, we show how the output x̂1, . . . , x̂T can be viewed as the output
of an instantiation of the mechanism analyzed by Lemma 3.8. For every t ∈ [T ] and q̂1, . . . , q̂t−1, we define
the measure Dt over database items to be
Dt(x) = exp
−(η/2) t−1∑
j=1
1 + q̂j(D)− q̂j(x)
 .
Notice that if we replace a single query q̂ℓ with q̂′ℓ and obtain the measure D′t, then for every x ∈ X ,∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
D˜t(x)
D˜′t(x)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ η.
Thus we can view x̂t as the output of an η-differentially private mechanism AD(q̂1, . . . , q̂t−1), which fits
into the framework of Lemma 3.8. (Here, x̂t plays the role of yt and q̂1, . . . , q̂t−1 plays the role of Dt−1 in
the description of the game, while the input database D is part of the description of A).
Now, in order to apply Lemma 3.8, we need to argue the distribution on samples q̂t when the query set
is Q0 is statistically close to the distribution on samples q̂t when the query set is Q1. Fix any t ∈ [T ] and let
Q0, Q1 be the measure Qt over queries maintained by the query player when the input query set is Q0,Q1,
respectively. For q 6= q∗, we have
Q0(q) = Q1(q) = exp
−(η/2) t−1∑
j=1
1 + q(D)− q(x̂j)
 .
Additionally, we set Q0(q∗) = 0 (for notational convenience), while Q1(q∗) ∈ (0, 1]. Thus, if we let
P0 = ΓsQ0 and P1 = ΓsQ1, we will have SD(P˜0, P˜1) ≤ 1/s by Lemma 3.9. Since the statistical distance
is 1/s = 1/12T , we can apply Lemma 3.8 to show that with probability at least 1− δ,∣∣∣∣ln( V (x̂1, . . . , x̂T )V ′(x̂1, . . . , x̂T )
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ η
√
T log(1/δ)
8
+
5η2T
2
≤ ε. (η = ε/(2√T log(1/δ)))
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Now that we have shown D̂ satisfies (ε, δ)-one-query-to-many-analyst differential privacy, it remains to
show that the remainder of the output satisfies perfect one-query-to-many-analyst privacy. Recall from the
proof of Theorem 3.1 that D̂ will be accurate for all but s queries. That is, if we let {fj}j∈[|Q|] consist of the
functions fj(D) = |qj(D)− qj(D̂)|, then
| {j | fj(D) ≥ α} | ≤ s,
where α is chosen as in Theorem 3.1. By Lemma 2.8, the sparse vector algorithm will release bits b1, . . . , b|Q|
(the indicator vector of the subset of queries with large error) such that for every j ∈ [|Q|], the distribution
on bj does not depend on any function fj′ for j′ 6= j. Thus, if z−a contains all the bits of b1, . . . , b|Q| that
do not correspond to queries in Qa, then the distribution of z−id does not depend on the queries asked by
analyst id, and thus z−id is perfectly one-query-to-many analyst private. Finally, for each query qj such that
bj = 1, the output to the owner of that query will include aj = qj(D) + zj where zj is an independent sam-
ple from the Laplace distribution. These outputs do not depend on any other query, and thus are perfectly
one-query-to-many analyst private. This completes the proof of the theorem.
4 A One-Analyst-to-Many-Analyst Private Mechanism
4.1 An Offline Mechanism for Linear Queries
In this section we present an algorithm for answering linear queries that satisfies the stronger notion of
one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy. The algorithm is similar to Algorithm 3, but with two notable modifi-
cations.
First, instead of the “query player” of Algorithm 3, we will have an “analyst player” who chooses
analysts as actions and is trying to find an analyst id ∈ [m] for which there is at least one query in Qid
with large error (recall that the queries are given to the mechanism in sets Q1, . . . ,Qm). That is, the analyst
player attempts to find id ∈ [m] to maximize maxq∈Qid q(D)− q(D̂).
Second, we will compute a database D̂ such that maxq∈Qid |q(D)−q(D̂)| is small for all but s analysts in
the set [m], rather than having the s mishandled queries in Algorithm 3. We can still use sparse vector to find
these s analysts, however we can’t answer the queries with the Laplace mechanism, since each of the analysts
may ask an exponential number of queries. However, since there are not too many analysts remaining, we
can use s independent copies of the multiplicative weights mechanism (each run with ε′ ≈ ε/√s) to handle
each analyst’s queries.
4.1.1 Accuracy Analysis
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 4 is (α, β)-accurate for
α = O˜
(√
log(|X |+m) log |Qid| log(m/β) log3/4(1/δ)
εn1/3
)
.
Proof. As we discussed above, the algorithm is computing an approximate equilibrium of the game
GD,Q(x, id) = max
id∈[m]
max
q∈Qid
1 + q(D)− q(x)
2
.
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Algorithm 4 Offline Mechanism for Linear Queries with One-Analyst-to-Many-Analyst Privacy
Input: Database D ∈ X n, and m sets of linear queries Q1, . . . ,Qm. For id ∈ [m], letQid = Qid∪¬Qid.
Initialize: Let D0(x) = 1/|X | for each x ∈ X , I0(q) = 1/m for each id ∈ [m],
T = n2/3max{log |X |,m}, η =
√
T log(1/δ)
2ǫ
, s = 12T.
DataPlayer:
On input an analyst îdt, for each x ∈ X , update:
Dt(x) = Dt−1(x) · exp
(
−η max
q∈Q
îdt
(
1 + q̂t(D)− q̂t(x)
2
))
Choose x̂t ←R D˜t and send x̂t to AnalystPlayer
AnalystPlayer:
On input a data element x̂t, for each id ∈ I , update:
It+1(id) = It(id) · exp
(
−η max
q∈Qid
(
1 + q(D)− q(x̂t)
2
))
Let Pt+1 = ΓsIt+1
Choose îdt+1 ←R P˜t+1 and send îdt+1 to DataPlayer
GenerateSynopsis:
Let D̂ = (x̂1, . . . , x̂T )
Run sparse vector on D̂, obtain a set of at most s analysts:
If = {id1, . . . , ids} ⊆ [m]
For each analyst id ∈ If , run AMW(D,Qid) with parameters
ε′ = ε
10
√
s log(3s/δ)
and δ′ = δ3s
Obtain a sequence of answers ~aid.
Output D̂ to all analysts.
For each id ∈ [m] \ If , output ~aid to analyst id
Let v, vs be the value and constrained value of this game, respectively. First we pin down the quantities v
and vs.
Claim 4.2. For every D,m,Q, the value and constrained value of GD,m,Q is 1/2.
The proof of this claim is omitted, but is nearly identical to that of Claim 3.2.
Let D̂ = 1T
∑T
t=1 x̂t. By Corollary 2.14,
vs − 2ρ ≤ max
I∈∆s([m])
E
id←RI˜
[
max
q∈Qid
(
1 + q(D)− q(D̂)
2
)]
≤ v + 2ρ.
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Applying Claim 4.2 and rearranging terms, we have that with probability 1− β/3,∣∣∣∣∣ maxI∈∆s([m])
(
E
id←RI˜
[
max
q∈Qid
q(D)− q(D̂)
])∣∣∣∣∣ = maxI∈∆s([m])
(
E
id←RI˜
[
max
q∈Qid
∣∣∣q(D)− q(D̂)∣∣∣]) ≤ 4ρ
= 4
(
η +
max{log |X |, logm}
ηT
+
4 log(3/β)√
T
)
= O
(√
log(|X |+m) log(1/δ) + log(1/β)
εn1/3
)
:= αD̂.
The previous statement suffices to show that maxq∈Qid |q(D)− q(D˜)| ≤ αD̂ for all but s analysts id ∈ [m].
Otherwise, the uniform distribution over the analysts for which the error bound of αD̂ does not hold would
be a distribution over analysts, contained in ∆s([m]) with expected error larger than αD̂.
Since there are at most s such analysts we can run the sparse vector algorithm (Lemma 2.8), and, with
probability at least 1− β/3, it will identify every analyst id such that the maximum error over all queries in
Qid is larger than αD̂ + αSV for
αSV = O
(√
s log(1/δ) log(m/β)
εn
)
.
There are at most s such analysts. Thus, running the multiplicative weights mechanism (Lemma 2.6) in-
dependently for each of these analysts’ queries—with privacy parameters ε′ = Θ(ε/
√
s log(s/δ)) and
δ′ = Θ(δ/s)—will yield answers such that, with probability 1− β/3, for every id ∈ I ′,
max
q∈Qid
|q(D)− aq| ≤ O
(
s1/4 log1/4 |X |√log(s|Qid|/β) log3/4(s/δ)√
εn
)
≤ O˜
(
n1/6
√
log(|X |+m) log(|Qid|/β) log3/4(1/δ)√
εn
)
≤ O˜
(√
log(|X | +m) log(|Qid|/β) log3/4(1/δ)
n1/3
√
ε
)
:= αMW.
Taking a union bound, observing that the maximum error on any query is max{αD̂ + αSV, αMW}, and
simplifying, we get that the mechanism is (α, β)-accurate for
α = O˜
(√
log(|X |+m) log |Qid| log(m/β) log3/4(1/δ)
εn1/3
)
.
4.1.2 Data Privacy
Theorem 4.3. Algorithm 4 satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy for the data.
We omit the proof of this theorem, which follows that of Theorem 3.3 almost identically. The only
difference is that in the final step, we need to argue that running s independent copies of multiplicative
weights with privacy parameters ε′ = Θ(ε/
√
s log(s/δ)) and δ′ = Θ(δ/s) satisfies (ε/3, δ/3)-differential
privacy, which follows directly from the composition properties of differential privacy (Lemma 2.9).
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4.1.3 Query Privacy
In this section we prove query privacy for our one analyst to many analyst mechanism.
Theorem 4.4. Algorithm 4 satisfies (ε, δ)-one-analyst-to-many-analyst differential privacy.
Proof. Fix a database D. Consider two adjacent sets of queries Q0,Q1. Without loss of generality assume
Q0 = Qid1 ∪ . . .Qidm and Q1 = Q0 ∪ Qid∗ . That is Q1 is just Q0 with an additional set of queries
Qid∗ added. We write the output to all analysts as v = (x̂1, . . . , x̂T , b1, . . . , bm,~a1, . . . ,~am) where D̂ =
x̂1, . . . , x̂T is the database that is released to all analysts, b1, . . . , bm is a sequence of bits that indicates
whether or not qj(D̂) is close to qj(D) for every q ∈ Qid, and ~a1, . . . ,~am is a sequence consisting of the
output of the multiplicative weights mechanism for every analyst id ∈ [m] and ⊥ for every other analyst.
Let V0, V1 be the distribution on outputs when the queries are Q0 and Q1, respectively.
The proof closely follows the proof of one-query-to-many-analyst privacy for Algorithm 3. Showing
that the final two parts b,~a of the output are query private is essentially the same, so we will focus on
proving that D̂ satisfies one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy.
Claim 4.5. With probability at least 1− δ over x̂1, . . . , x̂T ←R V0,∣∣∣∣ln(V0(x̂1, . . . , x̂T )V1(x̂1, . . . , x̂T )
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Proof of Claim 4.5. To prove the claim, we show how the output x̂1, . . . , x̂T can be viewed as the output of
an instantiation of the mechanism analyzed by Lemma 3.8. Notice that for every t ∈ [T ] and îd1, . . . , îdt−1,
we can write the measure Dt over database items as
Dt(x) = exp
−(η/2) t−1∑
j=1
max
q∈Q
îdj
1 + q̂j(D)− q̂j(x)
 .
If we replace a single analyst îdℓ with îd
′
ℓ, and obtain the measure D′t, then for every x ∈ X ,∣∣∣∣∣ln
(
D˜t(x)
D˜′t(x)
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ η.
Thus we can view x̂t as the output of an η-differentially private mechanism AD(îd1, . . . , îdt−1), which fits
into the framework of Lemma 3.8. (Here, x̂t plays the role of yt and îd1, . . . , îdt−1 plays the role of Dt−1
in the description of the game, while the input database D is part of the description of A).
As before, we apply Lemma 3.8, to argue that the distribution on analysts îdt when the query set is Q0
is statistically close to the distribution on analysts îdt when the analyst set is Q1. The argument does not
change significantly, thus we can apply Lemma 3.8 to show that with probability at least 1− δ,∣∣∣∣ln( V (x̂1, . . . , x̂T )V ′(x̂1, . . . , x̂T )
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ η
√
T log(1/δ)
8
+
5η2T
2
≤ ε. (η = ε/(2√T log(1/δ)))
As before, the remainder of the output satisfies perfect one-analyst-to-many-analyst privacy. This com-
pletes the proof of the theorem.
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5 A One-Query-to-Many-Analyst Private Online Mechanism
In this section, we present a mechanism that provides one-query-to-many-analyst privacy in an online set-
ting. The mechanism can give accurate answers to any fixed sequence of queries that are given to the
mechanism one at a time, rather than the typical setting of adaptively chosen queries.
The mechanism is similar to the online multiplicative weights algorithm of Hardt and Rothblum [HR10].
In their algorithm, a hypothesis about the true database is maintained throughout the sequence of queries.
When a query arrives, it is classified according to whether or not the current hypothesis accurately answers
that query. If it does, then the query is answered according to the hypothesis. Otherwise, the query is
answered with a noisy answer computed from the true database and the hypothesis is updated using the
multiplicative weights update rule.
The main challenge in making that algorithm query private is to argue that the hypothesis does not
depend too much on the previous queries. We overcome this difficulty by “sampling from the hypothesis.”
(recall that a database can be thought of as a distribution over the data universe). We must balance the
need to take many samples — so that the database we obtain by sampling accurately reflects the hypothesis
database, and the need to limit the impact of any one query on the sampled database. To handle both these
constraints, we introduce batching — instead of updating every time we find a query not well-answered by
the hypothesis, we batch together s queries at a time, and do one update on the average of these queries to
limit the influence of any single query.
A note on terminology: the execution of the algorithm takes place in several rounds, where each round
processes one query. Rounds where the query is answered using the real database are called bad rounds;
rounds that are not bad are good rounds. We will split the rounds into T epochs, where the hypothesis Ht is
used during epoch t.
5.1 Accuracy
First, we sketch a proof that the online mechanism answers linear queries accurately. Intuitively, there are
three ways that our algorithm might give an inaccurate answer, and we treat each separately. First, in a good
round, the answer given by the hypothesis may be a bad approximation to the true answer. Second, in a
bad round, the answer given may have too much noise. We address these two cases with straightforward
arguments showing that the noise is not too large in any round.
The third way the algorithm may be inaccurate is if there are more than R bad rounds, and the algorithm
terminates early. We show that this is not the case using a potential argument: after sufficiently many bad
rounds, the hypothesis DT and the sample HT will be accurate for all queries in the stream, and thus there
will be no more bad rounds. The potential argument is a simple extension of the argument in Hardt and
Rothblum [HR10] that handles the additional error coming from taking samples from Dt to obtain Ht.
We will use the following tail bound on sums of Laplace variables.
Lemma 5.1 ([GRU12]). Let X1, . . . ,XT be T independent draws from Lap(2/ε), and let X =
∑T
t=1Xt.
Then,
Pr
[
|X| > 5
√
T log(2/β)
ε
]
< β.
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 5 is (α, β)-accurate for
α = O
(
log3/2(k/β)
√
log |X | log(1/δ)
ε3/2n2/5
)
.
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Algorithm 5 Analyst-Private Multiplicative Weights for Linear Queries
Input:Database D ∈ X n, sequence q1, . . . , qk of linear queries
Initialize: D0(x) = 1/|X | for each x ∈ X , H0 = D0, U0 = ∅, s0 = s+ Lap(2/ε), t = 0, r = 0,
η =
1
n2/5
, s =
128n2/5
√
log |X | log(4k/β) log(1/δ)
ε
,
n̂ = 32n4/5 log(4k/β), T = n4/5 log |X |, R = 2sT,
σ =
20000 log3/4 |X | log1/4(4k/β) log5/4(4/δ)
ε3/2n2/5
,
τ =
80000 log3/4 |X | log5/4(4k/β) log5/4(4/δ)
ε3/2n2/5
.
AnswerQueries:
While t < T, r < R, i ≤ k, on input query qi:
Let zi = Lap(σ)
If |qi(D)− qi(Ht) + zi| ≤ τ : Output qi(Ht)
Else:
Let u = sgn(qi(Ht)− qi(D)− zi) · qi, Ut = Ut ∪ {u}
Output qi(D) + zi
Let r = r + 1
If |Ut| > st:
Let (Dt+1,Ht+1) = Update(Dt,Ut)
Let Ut+1 = ∅, st+1 = s+ Lap(2/ε)
Let t = t+ 1
Advance to query qi+1
Update:
Input: distribution Dt, update queries Ut = {u1, . . . , ust}
For each x ∈ X :
Let ut(x) = 13s
∑st
j=1 uj(x)
Update Dt+1(x) = exp(−(α′/2)ut(x))Dt(x)
Normalize Dt+1
Let Ht+1 be n̂ independent samples from Dt+1
Return: (Dt+1,Ht+1)
We note that we can achieve a slightly better dependence on k, |X |, 1ε , 1δ , 1β by setting the parameters a
bit more carefully. See Section 5.4 for an intuitive picture of how to set the parameters optimally. We have
made no attempt to optimize the constant factors in the algorithm.
Proof. First we show that, as long as the algorithm has not terminated early, it answers every query accu-
rately.
Claim 5.3. Before the algorithm terminates, with probability 1 − β/4, every query is answered with error
at most τ + 6σ log(3k/β)
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Proof of Claim 5.3. Condition on the event that |zi| ≤ 6σ log(4k/β) for every i = 1, 2, . . . , k. A standard
analysis of the tails of the Laplace distribution shows that this event occurs with probability at least 1−β/3.
First we consider bad rounds. In these rounds qi is answered with qi(D) + zi. Since we have assumed
|zi| is not too large, all of these queries are answered accurately.
Now we consider good rounds. In these rounds we answer with qi(Ht), and we will only have a good
round if |qi(D)− qi(Ht)+ zi| ≤ τ . Since we have assumed a bound on |zi|, we can only have a good round
if |qi(D)− qi(Ht)| ≤ τ + 6σ log(3k/β).
Now we must show that the algorithm does not terminate early. Recall that it can terminate early either
because it hits a limit on the number of epochs, or because it hits a limit on the number of bad rounds. We
will use a potential argument to show that there cannot be too many epochs. The number of bad rounds that
is in epoch t is a random variable st, and we will also show that with high probability, there are not too many
bad rounds within the T epochs.
Claim 5.4. With probability 1− 3β/4, the algorithm does not terminate before answering k queries.
Proof of Claim 5.4. We will use a potential argument a la Hardt and Rothblum [HR10] on the sequence of
databases Dt. The potential function will be
Φt = RE(D||Dt) :=
∑
x∈X
D(x) log(D(x)/Dt(x)).
Elementary properties of the relative entropy function show that Φt ≥ 0 and Φ0 = RE(D||D0) ≤ log |X |.
A lemma of Hardt and Rothblum expresses the potential decrease from the multiplicative weights update
rule in terms of the error of the current hypothesis on the update query.
Lemma 5.5 ([HR10]).
Φt−1 − Φt ≥ η (ut(D)− ut(Dt−1))− η2/4.
Since the potential function is bounded between 0 and log |X |, we can get a bound on the number of
epochs by showing that the potential decreases significantly between most epochs. Given the preceding
lemma, we simply need to show that the queries u1,u2, . . . have large (positive) error.
Recall that ut = 1s
∑
u∈Ut u. Also recall that if u ∈ U and u = qi, then the reason qi is in U is because
qi(D)− qi(Ht−1) + zi > τ . Similarly, if u = ¬qi, then qi(D)− qi(Ht−1) + zi < −τ . We will focus on the
first case where qi(D)− qi(Ht−1) + zi > τ , the other case will follow similarly. We can get a lower bound
on u(D)− u(Dt−1) as follows.
u(D)− u(Dt−1) ≥ u(D)− u(Ht−1) + zi − |zi| − |qi(Ht−1)− qi(Dt−1)|
≥ τ − |zi| − |qi(Ht−1)− qi(Dt−1)|
We need to show that the right-hand side of the final expression is large. We have already conditioned on
the event that |zi| ≤ 6σ log(3k/β) ≤ τ/4. Recall that Ht−1 is a collection of n̂ samples from Dt−1. Thus
a simple Chernoff bound (over the n̂ samples) and a union bound (over the k queries) shows that, with
probability 1− β/4, for every i ∈ [k], |qi(Dt−1)− qi(Ht−1)| ≤
√
16 log(3T/β)/n̂ ≤ τ/4.
Thus, with probability at least 1− 2β/3, for every t and every u ∈ Ut,
u(D)− u(Dt−1) ≥ τ − τ/4− τ/4 = τ/2.
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Now,
ut(D)− ut(Dt−1) = 1
s
∑
u∈Ut
u(D)− u(Dt−1) ≥ τ |Ut|
2s
.
Conditioning on the event that all of the noise values zi are small and all of the sampled hypotheses Ht are
accurate for Dt on every query, we can calculate
ΦT ′ − Φ0 ≥ ητ
2s
∑
t≤T ′
|Ut|
− T ′η2
=
ητ
2s
∑
t≤T ′
st
− T ′η2 = ητT ′
2
+
ητ
2s
∑
t≤T ′
St
− T ′η2,
where St is the value of the sample Lap(2/ε) used to compute st in the t-th epoch. Thus, applying
Lemma 5.1 to S =
∑
t≤T ′ St, we have that with probability 1− β/4,
ΦT ′ −Φ0 ≥ ητT
′
2
− ητ
2s
|S| − T ′η2
≥ ητT
′
2
− ητ
2s
5ε−1
√
T ′ log(20/β) − T ′η2.
Now, noting that τ/2 > 8η and simplifying,
ΦT ′ − Φ0 ≥ 2η2τT ′ − η2T ′ ≥ η2T ′.
Thus, conditioning on all the events above, T ′ ≤ log |X |/η2 ≤ n4/5 log |X |. These events all occur together
with probability at least 1 − 3β/4, and thus the algorithm does not terminate because it hits the limit of
T epochs. Lastly, we need to show that the algorithm does not hit the limit of R bad rounds within those
at-most T epochs. Notice that the number of bad rounds is at most
T∑
t=1
st =
T∑
t=1
s+ St,
where St is the sample of Lap(2/ε) used to compute st. Applying Lemma 5.1 again we have
T∑
t=1
s+ St ≤ Ts+
T∑
t=1
St ≤ Ts+ 5ε−1
√
T log(2/β) ≤ 2Ts = R.
Thus the algorithm does not terminate due to having more than R bad rounds. Since the algorithm does not
hit its limit of T epochs or R bad rounds, except with probability at most 3β/4, the claim is proven.
Combining the previous two claims proves the theorem.
5.2 Data Privacy
In this section we establish that our mechanism satisfies differential privacy. Our proof will rely on a modular
analysis of interactive differentially private algorithms from Gupta, Roth, and Ullman [GRU12]. Although
we have not presented our algorithm in their framework, the algorithm can easily be seen to fit, and thus we
will state an adapted version of their theorem without proof.
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Theorem 5.6 ([GRU12], Adapted). If Algorithm 5 experiences at most R bad rounds, and the parameters
are set so that σ ≥ 1000
√
R log(4/δ)
εn , then Algorithm 5 is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Theorem 5.7. Algorithm 5 satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
Proof. The theorem follows directly from Theorem 5.6 and our choice of R.
5.3 Query Privacy
More interestingly, we show that this mechanism satisfies one-query-to-many-analyst privacy.
Theorem 5.8. Algorithm 5 is (ǫ, δ)-one-query-to-many-analyst private.
Proof. Fix the input database D and the coins of the Laplace noise — we will show that for every value of
the Laplace random variables, the mechanism satisfies analyst privacy. Consider any two adjacent sequences
of queries Q0,Q1. Without loss of generality, we will assume that Q = q1, . . . , qk and Q′ = q∗, q1, . . . , qk.
For notational simplicity, we assume that every query in Q has a fixed index, regardless of the presence of
q∗. More generally, we could identify each query in the sequence by a unique index (say, a long random
string) that is independent of the other queries. We want to argue that the answers to all queries in Q are
private, but not that the answer to q∗ is private (if it is requested).
We will represent the answers to the queries in Q by a sequence {(Ht, it)}t∈[T ] where Ht is the hy-
pothesis used in the t-th epoch and it is the index of the last query in that epoch (the one that caused the
mechanism to switch to hypothesis Ht). Observe that for a fixed database D, Laplace noise, and sequence
of queries Q, we can simulate the output of the mechanism for all queries in Q given only this information
— once we fix a hypothesis Ht, we can determine whether any query q will be added to the update pool in
this epoch. So once we begin epoch t with hypothesis Ht, we have fixed all the bad rounds, and once we
are given it, we have determined when epoch t ends and epoch t + 1 begins. At this point, we fix the next
hypothesis Ht+1 and continue simulating.
Formally, let V0, V1 be distribution over sequences {(Ht, it)} when the query sequence is Q0,Q1, re-
spectively. We will show that with probability at least 1− δ, if {(Ht, it)}t∈[T ] is drawn from V0, then∣∣∣∣ln(V0({(Ht, it)})V1({(Ht, it)})
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
Recall that Ut is the set of queries that are used to update the distribution Dt to Dt+1. We will use
U≤t =
⋃t
j=0 Ut to denote the set of all queries used to update the distributions D0, . . . ,Dt. Notice that if q∗
does not get added to the set U0, then V0 and V1 will be distributed identically. Therefore, suppose q∗ ∈ U0.
First we must reason about the joint distribution of the first component of the output.
Claim 5.9. For all H0, i0, ∣∣∣∣ln(V0(H0, i0)V1(H0, i0)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 .
Proof of Claim 5.9. Since H0 does not depend on the query sequence, it will be identically distributed in
both cases. Once H0 is fixed, we can determine whether a query q will cause an update. Fix query qi0 and
assume that it is the s-th update query in the sequence q1, . . . , qk and the (s + 1)-st update query in the
sequence q∗, q1, . . . , qk. Then V0(i0|H0) = Pr [s0 = s] and V1(i0|H0) = Pr [s0 = s+ 1]. By the basic
properties of the Laplace distribution, | ln(V0(i0|H0)/V1(i0|H0))| ≤ ε/100.
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Now we reason about the remaining components (H1, i1), . . . , (HT , iT ).
Claim 5.10. For everyH0, i0, with probability at least 1−δ over the choice of components v = (H1, i1, . . . ,HT , iT )←R
(V0 | vt−1), we have ∣∣∣∣ln(V0(v | H0, i0)V1(v | H0, i0)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε2 .
Proof of Claim 5.10. We will show that v is the n̂T -fold composition of (ε0, 0)-differentially private mech-
anisms for suitable ε0. Fix a prefix vt−1 = H0, i0, . . . ,Ht−1, it−1. Given this prefix, we can determine for
any given sequence of queries q1, . . . , qit−1 or q∗, q1, . . . , qit−1 which queries are in the update set. More-
over, if U<t is the set of all update queries from the first query sequence, and U ′<t is the set of all update
queries from the second sequence, then U<t△U ′<t = q∗.
Now consider the distribution of Ht. Each sample in Ht comes from the distribution Dt, which is either
Dt(x) ∝ exp
−(η/s) ∑
u∈U<t
u
 or D′t(x) ∝ exp
−(η/s)1
s
∑
u∈U ′<t
u

Given this, it is easy to see that for any x we have | ln(Dt(x)/D′t(x))| ≤ 2η/s := ε0. Notice that once it−1
and Ht are fixed, it depends only on the choice of st (the number of bad rounds to allow before updating
the hypothesis), which is independent of the query sequence and thus incurs no additional privacy loss.
Thus the only privacy loss comes from the n̂ samples in each of the T epochs, and the mechanism is a n̂T -
fold adaptive composition of (ε0, 0) differentially private mechanisms. A standard composition analysis
(Lemma 2.9) shows that the components v are (ε′, δ)-DP for ε′ = ε0
√
2n̂T log(1/δ) + 2ε20T ≤ ε/2. This
completes the proof of the claim.
Combining these two claims proves the theorem.
5.4 Handling Arbitrary Low-Sensitivity Queries
We can also modify this mechanism to answer arbitrary ∆-sensitive queries, albeit with worse accuracy
bounds. As with our offline algorithms, we modify the algorithm to run the multiplicative weights updates
over the set of databases X n and adjust the parameters. When we run multiplicative weights over a support
of size |X |n (rather than |X |), the number of epochs increases by a factor of n, which in turn affects the
amount of noise we have to add to ensure privacy.
We will now sketch the argument, ignoring the parameters β and δ for simplicity. In order to get
convergence of the multiplicative weights distribution, we need to take T ≈ n log |X |η2 and in order to ensure
that Ht approximates Dt sufficiently well, we take n̂ ≈
√
log k
η2
. Recall that to argue analyst privacy, we
viewed the mechanism as being (essentially) the n̂T -fold composition of ε0-analyst private mechanisms,
where ε0 = η/s. In order to get analyst privacy, we needed
η
s
.
ε√
n̂T
≈ εη
2√
n log |X | log1/4 k
=⇒ s &
√
n log |X | log1/4 k
εη
.
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Once we have set s (as a function of the other parameters) to achieve analyst privacy, we can work on
establishing data privacy. As before, the number of bad rounds will be
R ≈ sT ≈ n
3/2 log3/2 |X | log1/4 k
εη3
.
Given this bound on the number of bad rounds, we need to set
σ ≈ ∆
√
R
ε
≈ ∆n
3/4 log3/4 |X | log1/8 k
εη3/2
to obtain data privacy, and
τ ≈ σ log k ≈ ∆n
3/4 log3/4 |X | log9/8 k
εη3/2
to ensure that all the update queries truly have large error on the current hypothesis Ht.
The final error bound will come from observing that η and τ are both lower bounds on the error. The
error is bounded below by τ because that is the noise threshold set by the algorithm, and τ must be larger
than η or else we cannot argue that multiplicative weights makes progress during update rounds. Thus
setting η = τ will approximately minimize the error.
The final error bound we obtain (ignoring the parameters β and δ) is
O
(
∆2/5n3/10 log3/10 |X | log9/20 k
ε2/5
)
,
which gives a non-trivial error guarantee when ∆≪ 1/n3/4.
6 Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to privately answer many queries while also preserving the privacy of the
data analysts even if multiple analysts may collude, or if a single analyst may register multiple accounts with
the data administrator. In the one-query-to-many-analyst privacy for linear queries in the non-interactive
setting, we are able to recover the nearly optimal O˜(1/
√
n) error bound achievable without promising
analyst privacy. However, it remains unclear whether this bound is achievable for one-analyst-to-many-
analyst privacy, or for non-linear queries, or in the interactive query release setting.
We have also introduced a novel view of the private query release problem as an equilibrium computation
problem in a two-player zero-sum game. This allows us to encode different privacy guarantees by picking
strategies of the different players and the neighboring relationship on game matrices (i.e., differing in a
single row for analyst privacy, or differing by 1/n in ℓ∞ norm for data privacy). We expect that this will be
a useful point of view for other problems. In this direction, it is known how to privately compute equilibria in
certain types of multi-player games [KPRU12]. Is there a useful way to use this multi-player generalization
when solving problems in private data release, and what does it mean for privacy?
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A Proof of Lemma 3.8
First we restate the lemma. Consider the following process:
• Fix an (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism A : U∗ →R and a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Let D0 = ∅.
• For t = 1, . . . T
– The (possibly randomized) adversary B(y1, . . . , yt; r) chooses two distributions B0t , B1t such
that SD(B0t , B1t ) ≤ σ.
– Choose xt ←R Bbt and let Dt = Dt−1 ∪ {xt}.
– Choose yt ←R A(Dt).
For a fixed mechanism A and adversary B, let V 0 be the distribution on (y1, . . . , yT ) when b = 0 and V 1
be the distribution on (y1, . . . , yT ) when b = 1.
Lemma A.1. If ε ≤ 1/2 and Tσ ≤ 1/12, then with probability at least 1−Tδ−δ′ over y = (y1, . . . , yT )←R
V 0, ∣∣∣∣ln(V 0(y)V 1(y)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε(Tσ)√2T log(1/δ′) + 30ε2(Tσ)T.
Proof. Given distributions B0, B1 such that SD(B0, B1) ≤ σ, there exist distributions C0, C1, C such that
B0 = σC0 + (1− σ)C and B1 = σC1 + (1− σ)C . An alternative way to sample from the distribution Bb
is to flip a coin c ∈ {0, 1} with bias σ, and if the coin comes up 1, sample from Cb, otherwise sample from
C .
Consider a partial transcript (r, y1, . . . , yt−1). Fixing the randomness of the adversary will fix the coins
c1, . . . , cT , which determine whether or not the adversary samples from Cbj or Cj for j ∈ [T ]. Let w =∑T
j=1 cj . Fixing the randomness of the adversary and y1, . . . , yt−1 will also fix the distributions Cj for
j ≤ t and, in rounds for which cj = 0, will fix the samples xj for j ≤ t. If we let D0t ,D1t denote the
database Dt in the case where b = 0, 1, respectively, then we have
|D0t −D1t | ≤
t∑
j=1
cj ≤
T∑
j=1
cj = w.
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Thus, ∣∣∣∣ln(V 0t (yt|r, y1, . . . , yt−1)V 1t (yt|r, y1, . . . , yt−1)
)∣∣∣∣ ≤ wε,
and
E
[
ln
(
V 0t (yt|r, y1, . . . , yt−1)
V 1t (yt|r, y1, . . . , yt−1)
)]
≤ wεmin {ewε − 1, 1} ,
where the expectation is taken over V 0t |r, y1, . . . , yt−1.
Fix w ∈ {0, . . . , T}. Conditioning on any r such that ∑Tt=1 ct = w, we can apply Azuma’s inequality
as in [DRV10] to obtain
DTδ+δ
′
∞ (V
0|w||V 1|w) ≤ wε
√
2T log(1/δ′) + wεmin {ewε − 1, 1} T.
Thus,
DTδ+δ
′
∞ (V
0||V 1) ≤
T∑
w=1
Pr [w]
(
wε
√
2T log(1/δ′) + wεmin {ewε − 1, 1} T
)
=
T∑
w=1
Pr [w]wε
√
2T log(1/δ′) +
T∑
w=1
Pr [w]wεmin {ewε − 1, 1} T. (1)
First, we consider the left sum in (1).
T∑
w=1
Pr [w]wε
√
2T log(1/δ′)
= ε
√
2T log(1/δ′)
T∑
w=1
(
T
w
)
σw(1− σ)T−ww
= ε
√
2T log(1/δ′)(Tσ)
T−1∑
w=0
(
T − 1
w
)
σw(1− σ)T−1−w ((Tw)w = (T−1w−1)T )
= ε
√
2T log(1/δ′)(Tσ)
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Now, we work on the right sum in (1).
T∑
w=1
Pr [w] (wεmin {ewε − 1, 1} T )
=
T∑
w=1
(
T
w
)
σw(1− σ)T−w (wεmin {ewε − 1, 1} T )
=
(
4ε2T
) 1/ε∑
w=1
(
T
w
)
σw(1− σ)T−ww + (εT )
T∑
w=1/ε
(
T
w
)
σw(1− σ)T−ww
=
(
4ε2T
) 1/ε∑
w=1
(
eTσ
w
)w
w2 + (εT )
T∑
w=1/ε
(
eTσ
w
)w
w
≤ (4ε2T ) 1/ε∑
w=1
(eTσ)w + (εT )
T∑
w=1/ε
(eTσ)w (w2/ww ≤ 1 for w ∈ N)
≤ 4ε2T (2eTσ) + 2(eTσ)−1/εεT ≤ 3ε2T (eTσ ≤ 1/4)
≤ 24ε2(Tσ)T + 4ε2(Tσ)T ≤ 30ε2(Tσ)T
Combining our bounds for the left and right sums in (1) completes the proof.
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